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Why Aceh peace missed the Nobel Peace Prize

2006-10-28T16:18:00.000-07:00

26 Oct. 2006 by Aboeprijadi Santoso Much to the disappointment of many, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf-Kalla government has missed the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize just as it enters its third year. However, the fact that the prize was not awarded to key figures involved in Aceh peace, could have been expected. The implementation of the Helsinki pact signed last year is unprecedented. This has been recognized precisely by not awarding the prize. The Norwegian Nobel Committee's decision is both traditional and innovative. As various peace efforts at state level were, as usual, considered, they opened a radically new horizon by awarding Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, introducing what is seen as a contribution at grass root level of the war against poverty to peace. It's not a new paradigm, though, but one whose importance is now recognized and emphasized. Peace is thus no longer viewed as a matter of working toward resolving conflicts at diplomatic level only. Situations on the ground could matter as much, as the devils often lie in crucial details. In both respects, though, Aceh peace may stand as a good example of, so far, a successful settlement. Since no progress has been made on the Middle East, one of world's greatest headaches, it's fair to assume that Aceh, the only regional conflict settled last year, must have been considered seriously. President Susilo as well as GAM (Free Aceh Movement) top leader Hasan di Tiro presided over the general discourse that led to the deal. Susilo, the former general, had been particularly instrumental in two ways: by isolating the havik general Ryamizard Ryacudu in order to guarantee security on the ground, and by agreeing - albeit at the very last minute - to GAM's key demand on local political parties. Credit, however, should go to Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and his team of five – significantly, all non-Javanese - who boldly pioneered a breakthrough by initiating a confident-building approach since mid-2003 and pushing toward a peace talk, and the peace-broker Martti Ahtisaari whose authority and skills had been highly respected and effective. The former Finland's president Ahtisaari is an experienced diplomat with a strong self-confidence - "very firm" and "father like", according to both parties. Like him, though, the Noble institute views peace and its nurturing ultimately depend on the conflicting parties – not the mediator. Noble Peace Prize winners are not necessarily those whom we believe to have done the greatest service for world peace. Surely, they must have made some contribution, however, the way the prizes were bestowed in the name of Alfred Nobel suggests that it should carry - as it did in recent past - a clear moral-political message. It should strengthen the values related to the cause the winners pursued, and in doing so encourage them toward the enhancement of peace, human rights and democracy. Since the chances to resolve conflicts vary, the resolutions obviously cannot be expected to be readily visible, let alone credible. It follows, even in cases where the issues have been settled, one has to judge whether the solutions seem solid, or need to be pushed forward. This, it seems, has been most critical: it is the ongoing processes toward peace with greater, not lesser, degree of difficulties, rather than some definite peace deals, that seem fit the mission of the Nobel Peace Prize - which thus needs greater consideration. A number of cases demonstrate the importance of this pattern. Bishop F. Carlos Belo and J. Ramos-Horta had gone through a great deal of troubles to campaign for the East Timorese legitimate right to self-determination, yet their ideal seemed far from politically `realistic' by 1996 - hence, they got the prize then. Similarly, Nelson Mandela and Fredrik de Klerk were under heavy pressures from inside and outside during their negotiation to democratize South Africa when they were awarded the prize in 1993 – given the difficulties and critical situation, that was one long year before Mandela was finally released from prison. The Northern Ierland parties (John Hume and David Trimble), too, needed a strong push by being awarded the prize in 1998 as the peace talk gained momentum while the decommissioning had yet to be implemented; the latter, as it turned out, took years before it materialized. Likewise, it seemed no coincident, that Mikhail Gorbachov was awarded the prize for his role in ending the Cold War in the critical year of 1990; and the critical nature was soon demonstrated by the pro-communist – and Yelstin coups. Seen from this point of view, it's only natural that Aung San Syu Kyii got the prize in 1991. Being imprisoned by a military junta, the Burmese pro-democra-tic leader and winner of the 1988 elections was unable to lead a campaign herself the way Belo and Ramos-Horta did. She thus deserved the prize. Another clear example of peace-effort-in-a-critical-momentum as a crucial criterion for awarding the prize, however, was when it was given to Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin in 1994. Never before had a better chance emerged to achieve a settlement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, yet it was also feared that the situation remained precarious (which proved correct as the talk later failed) – hence the Nobel push. In short, no Nobel Peace Prize has in the last fifteen years been awarded to a definite peace settlement. Instead it was consistenly decided to push peace efforts which were at a critical moments or facing great stumbling block. Thus, Aceh did not, as some have argued, miss the prize because of the tsunami factor. It's true the tsunami had radically changed Aceh and made possible the Helsinki deal, but it should be noticed that the parties had in fact agreed to start talking only a week before the tsunami strucked. Moreover, many, from the locals to European diplomats, who had been skeptic at the outset, have in the end applauded and generally believe in the peace pact and its implementation. No conflict has ever been resolved, with its crucial parts implemented, within less than two years as the Aceh issue. So, why should anyone, with Nobel ideal in mind, give award to what is seen as a successful conflict settlement, rather than encouraging other important efforts toward peace, human rights and democracy? Aceh peace has thus become a victim of its own success. The writer is journalist with Radio Netherlands.

Hengkang - Sinisme Amerika & Orde Baru

2005-12-12T18:21:00.000-08:00

oleh Aboeprijadi Santoso Hengkang pernah menjadi solusi zaman - kata yang tepat untuk pasukan asing yang menjadi tentara pendudukan atau tentara kolonial – untuk tentara Amerika yang harus mundur dari Vietnam, atau tentara Belanda dari Indonesia, dan tentara Indonesia dari Timor Timur, dsb. Tapi, di zaman terorisme, teror kelompok maupun teror negara, "hengkang" menjadi kadaluwarsa. Dia terlampau sederhana untuk menjadi solusi soal teror. Humor melawan teror Seorang kolomnis yang humoris, baru-baru ini menulis, kita perlu mengikuti jejak Gus Dur, yaitu menggunakan humor sebagai wahana melawan teror. Kawan tsb, Triagus Siswowiharjo, menyimpulkan: "Terorisme, teroris dan teror adalah kebodohan dan kekonyolan. Tak cukup (dihadapi) hanya dengan pendekatan hukum dan pendekatan agama. Masyarakat harus mulai menertawakan teroris dan simpatisannya karena mereka adalah musuh bersama. Para pelaku bom bunuh diri bukan syahid, tapi 'syakit' alias sakit. Berani mati, tapi takut hidup. Bukan jihad, tapi jahat. Ke Bali bukan jadi turis, tapi teroris. Bukan kebarat-baratan, tapi ke-arab-arab-an, dst. Mari kita melawan terorisme, teroris, dan teror dengan humor!" Gus Dur melawan teror dengan humor. Dengan semangat besar, tapi tenaga kurang. Pada tahun 1999, saat menjadi orang nomor satu di republik ini, dia menantang orang-orang dari luar Ambon yang mau masuk Ambon dengan dalih mau jihad. Gus memperingatkan secara serius, dengan gaya humoris: "Mau jihad kek, mau jahit kek, pokoknya orang yang masuk Ambon membawa senjata, harus ditangkap!" Seminggu kemudian orang-orang itu sudah masuk Ambon. Tak satu pun ditangkap. Sejak itu, pecah kerusuhan berdarah Ambon yang berkepanjangan sampai 2002, dan menelan ribuan korban tewas, luka dan kehilangan atap. Gus Dur mau menertawakan teroris, malah ditertawakan. Orang-orang itu masuk Ambon dari Surabaya. Pangdamnya di sana tak kuasa, atau tak mau bertindak. Humor Gus dibalas sinisme Pangdam. Dan mantan Pangdam itu sekarang menjadi salah satu petinggi di Jakarta. Sinisme Condy Rice Pekan lalu ada sinisme Condoleezza Rice. Menlu Amerika ini lihay bersilat lidah. "Tentara Amerika," katanya, "tidak membenarkan aniaya dan tetap menghormati hukum internasional. Penerbangan- penerbangan Amerika dilakukan seperti lazimnya". Media Eropa bingung. BBC Newsnight menganggap Condy membantah penerbangan gelap Amerika itu menyinggung kehormatan negara-negara Eropa. Sebaliknya, media Belanda, NOVA, menunjuk, Condy mengakui ada penerbangan gelap yang mengangkut tawanan Amerika. Hebat nian sinisme Condy. Sejak kasus Guantánamo dan Abu Ghraib, kita tahu, Condy bohong soal aniaya dan konvensi internasional tadi. Condy tidak bicara soal kedaulatan, karena penerbangan itu diketahui aparat intelejen negara- negara Eropa ybs. Tapi dia tidak bicara secara tegas soal penerbangan rahasia sejumlah tawanan yang diperiksa dan dianiaya secara rahasia, di tempat-tempat tahanan tang dirahasiakan di Eropa. Padahal di situlah intinya, dan itu pula yang disamarkan oleh Menlu Amerika itu. Papua & Timor Leste Soal sinisme yang menyamarkan kenyataan bukan gejala baru. Nasionalisme yang membuta juga seringkali menyamarkan kenyataan. Di Papua, nasionalisme Indonesia yang dikembangkan Dr. Sam Ratulangi dan Sugoro lambat laun pupus oleh keangkuhan Indonesia, disusul tipu daya Pepera 1969 oleh Orde Baru. Banyak negara Asia Afrika ikut menggugat menjelang Sidang Umum PBB 1962. Solidaritas Asia-Afrika baru (pasca-1955) yang menentang kolonialisme baru, menjadi lebih hebat lagi semasa Indonesia secara kejam menduduki Timor Timur. Tetapi – ini sangat komis, alias lucu - para pewaris Orde Baru mau pun para penentang Orde Baru di rantau beranggapan seolah-olah solidaritas Asia-Afrika 1955 selalu utuh tak kenal lekang, sehingga seluruh spektrum politik Indonesia merayakan nostalgila Asia-Afrika April 2005 yang lalu. Sinisme ini tidak malu malu untuk bersikap membuta terhadap hak hak rakyat Papua dan Timor Timur. (Orde Baru jelas tak peduli, tapi mengapa orang orang kiri dan nasionalis Indonesia di rantau tidak memperingati invasi Indonesia di TimTim 7 Des. yang lalu?) Bush vs Kennedy Kembali ke Irak. Perang Irak adalah sinisme negara-negara besar di kawasan strategis Teluk Parsi. Selama dua tahun, perang itu menelan korban lebih dari 10 kali lipat perang 30 tahun di Aceh. 100an ribu warga Irak dan lebih dari dua ribu tentara Amerika tewas. Awalnya adalah dalih adanya senjata pemusnah massal yang disimpan Saddam, yang ternyata bohong. Kemudian, targetnya, katanya, adalah "pergantian rezim" dan tujuannya "menghidupkan demokrasi". Ternyata, kedua istilah itu menjadi eufemisme untuk perang dan dalih untuk memperpanjang kehadiran tentara pendudukan, yang kewalahan menghadapi teror dan perlawanan. Lantas, pendudukan berubah jadi kejahatan perang ketika aniaya menjadi bagian dari rutinitas. "Aniaya sama saja dengan teror," seru sejumlah aktivis HAM Amerika. Yang menarik, dalam situasi keputusasaan George W. Bush tentang Irak dewasa ini, sejumlah mantan pembantu presiden Kennedy kini bertanya- tanya "What would JFK have done?" Apa yang akan dilakukan John Kennedy jika dia berada pada posisi George W. Bush? Ketika menghadapi Perang Vietnam awal tahun 1960an, situasi Vietnam mirip Irak dewasa ini. Meninggalkan komitmen membantu pemerintah Saigon dengan menarik bantuan militer? Tidak mungkin, sebab rakyat Amerika akan mencelanya. Melakukan Amerikanisasi terhadap Perang Vietnam dengan mengirim pasukan, seperti dilakukan Johnson belakangan? Tidak mungkin. Sebab, Amerika tahu, tentaranya tidak mungkin meraih kemenangan terhadap rakyat yang bertekad mengusir pasukan asing dari Vietnam. Umumkan saja Amerika sudah menang, lantas pergi. Tidak mungkin juga, sebab tak ada sedikit pun indikasi untuk memperlihatkan kemenangan Amerika. Mencari mitra runding? Juga mustahil, sebab tak ada pemimpin Vietnam yang bisa diajak kompromi. George W. Bush di tahun 2005 menghadapi situasi Irak serupa Kennedy menatap situasi Vietnam tahun 1963. Tapi Kennedy, presiden Amerika pertama yang mengirim pasukan tempur ke Vietnam itu, punya exit strategy, alias strategi hengkang. Bedanya Kennedy terbunuh, dan rencana hengkang itu berubah jadi tragedi perang Johnson, dan akhirnya tertunda 12 tahun. Bagaimana dengan Bush? Amerika dan pemerintah Irak yang didukungnya terjungkal di Falluja, setiap hari dihajar aksi teror dan perlawanan, tapi masih juga bernyanyi "membangun demokrasi". Scott- Burchill, pengamat tajam dari Australia, memastikan, Amerika tak akan hengkang dari kawasan strategis Amerika itu. Johnson akhirnya hengkang tahun 75, maklum, apalah yang mau diraih Amerika di Vietnam kecuali membendung domino komunis yang akhirnya juga gagal. Tapi bagaimana jika krisis energi dan industri melanda Amerika kalau Amerika hengkang dari Irak? Bush, dengan kata lain, terpaksa akan membangun imperium di kawasan Teluk. TNI hengkang Indonesia di bawah Orde Baru-nya Soeharto juga mau memaksakan sebuah imperium di Nusantara dengan mencaplok Timur Timur. Pekan lalu, tepat 30 tahun silam tentara Indonesia menyerbu TimTim dengan ganas. Pekan ini juga dokumen-dokumen rahasia Amerika mengungkap dukungan konsisten Amerika bagi pendudukan Indonesia di TimTim. Akhirnya tentara itu hengkang September tahun 1999. Di Aceh, tentara yang dianggap mengganggu rakyat, sebagian besar, akhirnya berhasil dipaksa hengkang lewat Kesepakatan Helsinki. Menyusul hengkangnya 'tamu-tamu' bersenjata yang tak dikehendaki, negeri-negeri itu menjadi lebih merdeka, lebih aman dan dapat menyambut prospek yang lebih demokratis. Tinggal untuk Irak, soal hengkang belum juga kadaluwarsa. Masih ada petualangan Amerika yang belum juga memahami makna solusi hengkang. Digubah dari kolom penulis Radio Nederland 9 Des. 2005

From East Timor to Aceh

2005-10-28T21:22:00.000-07:00

East Timor, the Geography of the Militias, 1999 The day of self-determination, August 30, 1999 The Independence Day, May 20, 2002. Aceh, PHIA Poster, Langsa, Eastern Aceh. Mahdi's Aceh in Distress, Banda Aceh, Oct, 2005. General Elections, Apr, 2004, Aceh General Elections, Apr, 2004, Tiro, Pidie, Aceh General Elections, Apr, 2004, Sawang, Aceh. Aceh at war, DM, Darurat Militer, 2003-04 Tsunami, Sadness. Tsunami, A South Korean NGO, Meulaboh, Jan. 2005 Tsunami, Ulee Lheue, Aceh, Feb. 2005. Juha Christensen, Helsinki, Apr, 2005. M.Ahtisaari, CMI, Helsinki, Jan-August, 2005. Helsinki, August 2005 Peace Talks, Helsinki Jan-August 2005 The Signing Ceremony, Helsinki, August. 15, 2005 Ready for de-commisioning, Central Aceh, Sept. 2005. Peace = Anti Militarism

Jusuf & Ramli, Two New Friends from Banda Aceh

2005-10-27T12:06:00.000-07:00

M.Jusuf One evening just as I needed a public transport, I came accross one man riding a Honda vehicle. I realized, Pavilyun Seulawah at Blang Padang Square is not a good place to find a transport mean, be it a becak or ojek, let alone a labi-labi (small van for 10 people, called oplet elsewhere). I just said hallo to someone passing with his Honda. We had a small chat, then he offered to bring me to Media Centre at Jalan Merak, Sukadamai. He introduced himself as M. Jusuf, a young man but I called him Pak Jusuf. He's a kind man, very sincere. He refused to accept money for bringing me to the place where I should be. Later he invited me to break fasting, buka puasa, at his very simple place where he sells sugarcane water, air tebu. His "restaurant" turned out to be a very popular one. Every day, about three hours before buka puasa, everybody came to buy his sweet sugar cane water. Jusuf is simple, kind and sincere. He even called me when I'm already in Holland. I told him just send a SMS, which he did. Here is the man, M. Jusuf, at work with his sugarcanes: see photo. Ramli A.Dally Pak Ramli is another very nice Acehnese man. I got his name from a friend who told me about this very unique person. Ramli A. Dally used to work at Pusat Dokumentasi & Informasi Aceh (PDIA), a documentary center on Aceh, now unfortunately vanished, swollen by the tsunami. So many unique and precious documents on Aceh, in particular on the Dutch war in Aceh, are now gone. All one can hope for Aceh is to acquire copies from museums in the Netherlands. Pak Ramli could tell stories for hours based on his knowledge about those documents at the PDIA. One of his very good true stories is about the duel and peace between Teuku Abeuek, an ulleebalang of West Aceh, and a Dutch officer called, Lietenant J.H.J. Brendgen, in 1920s. This story I recorded, and wrote, linking it to the Helsinki peace deal, for a TEMPO column published Oct. 17, which I reproduce here (see below). Ramli is simply a very good narrator, a very kind man with great interest in Acehnese history. He brought me to the cemetery of Dutch soldiers killed in the Aceh war (1873-1920). A honest man I love to remember. See: two photo's of him, a close up and at the Dutch cemetery.

Ben Anderson's "Petrus Dadi Ratu"

2005-10-23T11:57:00.000-07:00

preface September 30, 1965 In late 1965 and early 1966, one of the greatest mass killings of the twentieth century was carried out in Indonesia, the slaughter in a few weeks of hundreds of thousands of real or alleged Communists. The massacres set the stage for Suharto’s thirty-two-year dictatorship. Behind them lay events of a few days, still sinister and obscure. On September 30, 1965 a group of middle-ranking army officers, most of them originating from the Diponegoro Division centred in Semarang, and once commanded by Suharto, attempted a coup de force in Jakarta. Claiming that a Council of Generals was planning to seize power from Sukarno, President of the country since independence, they killed six top generals in Jakarta, took Sukarno to an air base outside the capital, and proclaimed a revolutionary council. In Central Java, local garrisons followed suit. Lieutenant-Colonel Untung of Sukarno’s Presidential Guard was nominal leader of the movement, backed by forces from two battalions in the capital; youths from a recently formed militia containing Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) volunteers were entangled as auxiliaries. The two Army generals who controlled major concentrations of troops in Jakarta—logically prime targets for the strike—were left untouched. The senior was Suharto. In the course of October 1, he quickly gained control of the situation, putting the leaders of the movement to flight and taking over the air base where they had installed Sukarno. The following day, the risings in Central Java were crushed. With the President now in his hands, Suharto proclaimed the Communist Party, which Sukarno had relied on as a counterweight to the Army, the author of the events of September 30. Two weeks later, a nation-wide pogrom was unleashed to exterminate it. The PKI then numbered some three million members—the largest Communist Party in the world outside Russia and China. By the end of the year, nothing was left of it. In March 1966 Sukarno, held under surveillance in the Presidential Palace, was forced to sign a decree giving Suharto executive authority. A year later, this new left review 3 may jun 2000 5 became the formal basis for Suharto’s assumption of the Presidency, well after he had in practice become the absolute ruler of the country. Suharto’s New Order lasted until 1998, when the Asian financial crisis fi nally brought him down. Military terror outlived him in East Timor. But with the election of Wahid as President in 1999, survivors have begun to speak out, breaking the silence that for three decades surrounded the massacres of 1965. But the events that paved the way for the slaughter have yet to be fully explained. Did a Council of Generals ever exist? Who really planned the ‘movement of September 30’, and what were their intentions? Was the PKI, or a section of its leadership, party to the coup? How did Suharto manage to seize power so quickly? The first detailed attempt to consider these problems was a confidential paper by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, written in January 1966, and eventually published by the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project in 1971.1 For this analysis, Benedict Anderson was banned from Indonesia by the military dictatorship for twenty-six years. Last year, able to travel to the country again, he delivered an address in Jakarta in which he urged the need for Indonesians to face the swamp of murder and torture on which the New Order had been built, rather than merely protesting its corruption.2 In the months since, as Wahid has widened the space for political expression, the start of a catharsis has moved more quickly than anyone could have expected. Among the documents to emerge on the genesis of Suharto’s regime, the Defence Speech of Colonel Abdul Latief—leading survivor of the September 30th movement—at his trial in 1979, has been the most pregnant. We publish below Benedict Anderson’s review of it, written in Indonesian for the Jakarta weekly Tempo of 10–16 April of this year. 1 A redaction of some of its findings by Peter Wollen was released in NLR I/36, March–April 1966.2 See ‘Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future’, NLR I/235, May–June 1999. 6 nlr 3 benedict anderson PETRUS DADI RATU In the early 1930s, Bung Karno [Sukarno] was hauled before a Dutch colonial court on a variety of charges of ‘subversion’. He was perfectly aware that the whole legal process was prearranged by the authorities, and he was in court merely to receive a heavy sentence. Accordingly, rather than wasting his time on defending himself against the charges, he decided to go on the attack by laying bare all aspects of the racist colonial system. Known by its title ‘Indonesia Accuses!’ his defence plea has since become a key historical document for the future of the Indonesian people he loved so well. Roughly forty-five years later, Colonel Abdul Latief was brought before a special military court—after thirteen years in solitary confi nement, also on a variety of charges of subversion. Since he, too, was perfectly aware that the whole process was prearranged by the authorities, he followed in Bung Karno’s footsteps by turning his defence plea into a biting attack on the New Order, and especially on the cruelty, cunning and despotism of its creator. It is a great pity that this historic document has had to wait twenty-two years to become available to the Indonesian people whom he, also, loves so well.1 But who is, and was, Abdul Latief, who in his youth was called Gus Dul? While still a young boy of fi fteen, he was conscripted by the Dutch for basic military training in the face of an impending mass assault by the forces of Imperial Japan. However, the colonial authorities quickly surrendered, and Gus Dul was briefl y imprisoned by the occupying Japanese. Subsequently, he joined the Seinendan and the Peta in East Java.2 After the Revolution broke out in 1945, he served continuously on the front lines, at first along the perimeter of Surabaya, and subsequently in Central Java. Towards the end he played a key role in the famous General Assault of March 1, 1949 on Jogjakarta [the revolutionary capital just cap- new left review 3 may jun 2000 7 tured by the Dutch]: directly under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Suharto. After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, Latief led combat units against various rebel forces: the groups of Andi Azis and Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi; the separatist Republic of the South Moluccas; the radical Islamic Battalion 426 in Central Java, the Darul Islam in West Java, and finally the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia [CIA-financed and armed rebellion of 1957–58] in West Sumatra. He was a member of the second graduating class of the Staff and Command College (Suharto was a member of the fi rst class). Finally, during the Confrontation with Malaysia, he was assigned the important post of Commander of Brigade 1 in Jakarta, directly under the capital’s Territorial Commander, General Umar Wirahadikusumah. In this capacity he played an important, but not central, role in the September 30th Movement of 1965. From this sketch it is clear that Gus Dul was and is a true-blue combat soldier, with a psychological formation typical of the nationalist freedom-fighters of the Independence Revolution, and an absolute loyalty to its Great Leader.3 His culture? The many references in his defence speech both to the Koran and to the New Testament indicate a characteristic Javanese syncretism. Standard Marxist phraseology is almost wholly absent. And his accusations? The first is that Suharto, then the Commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve [Kostrad], was fully briefed beforehand, by Latief himself, on the Council of Generals plotting Sukarno’s overthrow, and on the September 30th Movement’s plans for preventive action. General Umar too was informed through the hierarchies of the Jakarta Garrison and the Jakarta Military Police. This means that Suharto deliberately allowed the September 30th Movement to start its operations, and did not report on it to his superiors, General Nasution and General Yani.4 By the same token, Suharto was perfectly positioned to take action against the September 30th Movement, once his rivals at the top of the 1 Kolonel Abdul Latief, Soeharto Terlibat G30S—Pledoi Kol. A. Latief [Suharto was Involved in the September 30 Movement—Defence Speech of Colonel A. Latief ] Institut Studi Arus Informasi: Jakarta 2000, 285 pp. 2 Respectively: paramilitary youth organization and auxiliary military apparatus set up by the Japanese.3 Ironic reference to the title Sukarno gave himself in the early 1960s.4 Nasution was Defence Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Yani Army Chief of Staff. Yani was killed on October l, and Nasution just escaped with his life. 8 nlr 3 military command structure had been eliminated. Machiavelli would have applauded. We know that Suharto gave two contradictory public accounts of his meeting with Latief late in the night of September 30th at the Army Hospital. Neither one is plausible. To the American journalist Arnold Brackman, Suharto said that Latief had come to the hospital to ‘check’ on him (Suharto’s baby son Tommy was being treated for minor burns from scalding soup). But ‘checking’ on him for what? Suharto did not say. To Der Spiegel Suharto later confided that Latief had come to kill him, but lost his nerve because there were too many people around (as if Gus Dul only then realized that hospitals are very busy places!). The degree of Suharto’s commitment to truth can be gauged from the following facts. By October 4, 1965, a team of forensic doctors had given him directly their detailed autopsies on the bodies of the murdered generals. The autopsies showed that all the victims had been gunned down by military weapons. But two days later, a campaign was initiated in the mass media, by then fully under Kostrad control, to the effect that the generals’ eyes had been gouged out, and their genitals cut off, by members of Gerwani [the Communist Party’s women’s affiliate]. These icy lies were planned to create an anti-communist hysteria in all strata of Indonesian society. Other facts strengthen Latief’s accusation. Almost all the key military participants in the September 30th Movement were, either currently or previously, close subordinates of Suharto: Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, Colonel Latief, and Brigadier-General Supardjo in Jakarta, and Colonel Suherman, Major Usman, and their associates at the Diponegoro Division’s HQ in Semarang. When Untung got married in 1963, Suharto made a special trip to a small Central Javanese village to attend the ceremony. When Suharto’s son Sigit was circumcised, Latief was invited to attend, and when Latief’s son’s turn came, the Suharto family were honoured guests. It is quite plain that these officers, who were not born yesterday, fully believed that Suharto was with them in their endeavour to rescue Sukarno from the conspiracy of the Council of Generals. Such trust is incomprehensible unless Suharto, directly or indirectly, gave his assent to their plans. It is therefore not at all surprising that Latief’s answer to my question, ‘How did you feel on the evening of October 1st?’—Suharto had full control of the capital by late afternoon—was, ‘I felt I had been betrayed.’ anderson: Indonesia 9 Furthermore, Latief’s account explains clearly one of the many mysteries surrounding the September 30th Movement. Why were the two generals who commanded directly all the troops in Jakarta, except for the Presidential Guard—namely Kostrad Commander Suharto and Jakarta Military Territory Commander Umar—not ‘taken care of’ by the September 30th Movement, if its members really intended a coup to overthrow the government, as the Military Prosecutor charged? The reason is that the two men were regarded as friends. A further point is this. We now know that, months before October 1, Ali Murtopo, then Kostrad’s intelligence chief, was pursuing a foreign policy kept secret from both Sukarno and Yani. Exploiting the contacts of former rebels,5 clandestine connexions were made with the leaderships of two then enemy countries, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as with the United States. At that time Benny Murdani6 was furthering these connexions from Bangkok, where he was disguised as an employee in the local Garuda [Indonesian National Airline] office. Hence it looks as if Latief is right when he states that Suharto was two-faced, or, perhaps better put, two-fisted. In one fist he held Latief–Untung–Supardjo, and in the other Murtopo–Yoga Sugama7–Murdani. The second accusation reverses the charges of the Military Prosecutor that the September 30th Movement intended to overthrow the government and that the Council of Generals was a pack of lies. Latief’s conclusion is that it was precisely Suharto who planned and executed the overthrow of Sukarno; and that a Council of Generals did exist —composed not of Nasution, Yani, et al., but rather of Suharto and his trusted associates, who went on to create a dictatorship based on the Army which lasted for decades thereafter. Here once again, the facts are on Latief’s side. General Pranoto Reksosamudro, appointed by President/Commander-in-Chief Sukarno as acting Army Commander after Yani’s murder, found his appointment rejected by Suharto, and his person soon put under detention. Aidit, Lukman and Nyoto, the three top leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party, then holding ministerial rank in Sukarno’s government, were murdered out of hand. And although President Sukarno did his utmost to prevent it, Suharto and 5 From the 1957–58 civil war, when these people were closely tied to the CIA as well as the Special Branch in Singapore and Malaya.6 The legendary Indonesian military intelligence czar of the 1970s and 1980s. 7 A Japanese-trained high-ranking intelligence offi cer. 10 nlr 3 his associates planned and carried out vast massacres in the months of October, November and December 1965. As Latief himself underlines, in March 1966 a ‘silent coup’ took place: military units surrounded the building where a plenary cabinet meeting was taking place, and hours later the President was forced, more or less at gunpoint, to sign the super-murky Supersemar.8 Suharto immediately cashiered Sukarno’s cabinet and arrested fifteen ministers. Latief’s simple verdict is that it was not the September 30th Movement which was guilty of grave and planned insubordination against the President, ending in his overthrow, but rather the man whom young wags have been calling Mr. TEK.9 Latief’s third accusation is broader than the others and just as grave. He accuses the New Order authorities of extraordinary, and wholly extralegal, cruelty. That the Accuser is today still alive, with his wits intact, and his heart full of fire, shows him to be a man of almost miraculous fortitude. During his arrest on October 11, 1965, many key nerves in his right thigh were severed by a bayonet, while his left knee was completely shattered by bullets (in fact, he put up no resistance). In the Military Hospital his entire body was put into a gypsum cast, so that he could only move his head. Yet in this condition, he was still interrogated before being thrust into a tiny, dank and filthy isolation cell where he remained for the following thirteen years. His wounds became gangrenous and emitted the foul smell of carrion. When on one occasion the cast was removed for inspection, hundreds of maggots came crawling out. At the sight, one of the jailers had to run outside to vomit. For two and a half years Latief lay there in his cast before being operated on. He was forcibly given an injection of penicillin, though he told his guards he was violently allergic to it, with the result that he fainted and almost died. Over the years he suffered from haemorrhoids, a hernia, kidney stones, and calcification of the spine. The treatment received by other prisoners, especially the many military men among them, was not very different, and their food was scarce and often rotting. It is no surprise, 8 Acronym for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Decree of March 11, which turned over most executive functions ad interim to Suharto; the acronym deliberately exploits the name of Semar, magically powerful figure in Javanese shadow puppet theatre. 9 ‘Thug Escaped from Kemusu’: the Suharto regime regularly named all its supposed subversive enemies as GPK, Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, or Order-Disturbing Elements. The wags made this Gali Pelarian Kemusu—Suharto was born in the village of Kemusu. anderson: Indonesia 11 therefore, that many died in the Salemba Prison, many became paralytics after torture, and still others went mad. In the face of such sadism, perhaps even the Kempeitai10 would have blanched. And this was merely Salemba—one among the countless prisons in Jakarta and throughout the archipelago, where hundreds of thousands of human beings were held for years without trial. Who was responsible for the construction of this tropical Gulag? History textbooks for Indonesia’s schoolchildren speak of a colonial monster named Captain ‘Turk’ Westerling. They usually give the number of his victims in South Sulawesi in 1946 as forty thousand. It is certain that many more were wounded, many houses were burned down, much property looted and, here and there, women raped. The defence speech of Gus Dul asks the reader to reflect on an ice-cold ‘native’ monster, whose sadism far outstripped that of the infamous Captain. In the massacres of 1965–66, a minimum of six hundred thousand were murdered. If the reported deathbed confession of Sarwo Edhie to Mas Permadi is true, the number may have reached over two million. 11 Between 1977 and 1979, at least two hundred thousand human beings in East Timor died before their time, either killed directly or condemned to planned death through systematic starvation and its accompanying diseases. Amnesty International reckons that seven thousand people were extra-judicially assassinated in the Petrus Affair of 1983. 12 To these victims, we must add those in Aceh, Irian, Lampung, Tanjung Priok and elsewhere. At the most conservative estimate: eight hundred thousand lives, or twenty times the ‘score’ of Westerling. And all these victims, at the time they died, were regarded officially as fellow-nationals of the monster. Latief speaks of other portions of the national tragedy which are also food for thought. For example, the hundreds of thousands of people who spent years in prison, without clear charges against them, and without any due process of law, besides suffering, on a routine basis, excruciat 10 Japanese military police, famous for war-time brutality.11 Then Colonel Sarwo Edhie, commander of the elite Red Beret paratroops, was the operational executor of the massacres; Mas Permadi is a well-known psychic.12 The organized slaughter of petty hoodlums, often previously agents of the regime. A grim joke of the time called the death-squads of soldiers-in-mufti ‘Petrus’, as in St. Peter, an acronym derived from Penembak Misterius or Mysterious Killers. 12 nlr 3 ing torture. To say nothing of uncountable losses of property to theft and looting, casual, everyday rapes, and social ostracism for years, not only for former prisoners themselves, but for their wives and widows, children, and kinfolk in the widest sense. Latief’s J’accuse was written twenty-two years ago, and many things have happened in his country in the meantime. But it is only now perhaps that it can acquire its greatest importance, if it serves to prick the conscience of the Indonesian people, especially the young. To make a big fuss about the corruption of Suharto and his family, as though his criminality were of the same gravity as Eddy Tansil’s,13 is like making a big fuss about Idi Amin’s mistresses, Slobodan Miloševic´’s peculations, or Adolf Hitler’s kitschy taste in art. That Jakarta’s middle class, and a substantial part of its intelligentsia, still busy themselves with the cash stolen by ‘Father Harto’ (perhaps in their dreams they think of it as ‘our cash’) shows very clearly that they are still unprepared to face the totality of Indonesia’s modern history. This attitude, which is that of the ostrich that plunges its head into the desert sands, is very dangerous. A wise man once said: Those who forget/ignore the past are condemned to repeat it. Terrifying, no? Important as it is, Latief’s defence, composed under exceptional conditions, cannot lift the veil which still shrouds many aspects of the September 30th Movement and its aftermath. Among so many questions, one could raise at least these. Why was Latief himself not executed, when Untung, Supardjo, Air Force Major Suyono, and others had their death sentences carried out? Why were Yani and the other generals killed at all, when the original plan was to bring them, as a group, face-to-face with Sukarno? Why did First Lieutenant Dul Arief of the Presidential Guard, who actually led the attacks on the generals’ homes, subsequently vanish without a trace? How and why did all of Central Java fall into the hands of supporters of the September 30th Movement for a day and a half, while nothing similar occurred in any other province? Why did Colonel Suherman, Major Usman and their associates in Semarang also disappear without a trace? Who really was Syam alias Kamaruzzaman14—former official of the Recomba of the Federal 13 Famous high-flying Sino-Indonesian crook who escaped abroad with millions of embezzled dollars.14 Allegedly the head of the Communist Party’s secret Special Bureau for military affairs, and planner of the September 30th Movement. anderson: Indonesia 13 State of Pasundan,15 former member of the anti-communist Indonesian Socialist Party, former intelligence operative for the Greater Jakarta Military Command at the time of the huge smuggling racket run by General Nasution and General Ibnu Sutowo out of Tanjung Priok, as well as former close friend of D. N. Aidit? Was he an army spy in the ranks of the Communists? Or a Communist spy inside the military? Or a spy for a third party? Or all three simultaneously? Was he really executed, or does he live comfortably abroad with a new name and a fat wallet? Latief also cannot give us answers to questions about key aspects of the activities of the September 30th Movement, above all its political stupidities. Lieutenant-Colonel Untung’s radio announcement that starting from October 1st, the highest military rank would be the one he himself held, automatically made enemies of all the generals and colonels in Indonesia, many of whom held command of important combat units. Crazy, surely? Why was the announced list of the members of the so-called Revolutionary Council so confused and implausible?16 Why did the Movement not announce that it was acting on the orders of President Sukarno (even if this was untrue), but instead dismissed Sukarno’s own cabinet? Why did it not appeal to the masses to crowd into the streets to help safeguard the nation’s head? It passes belief that such experienced and intelligent leaders as Aidit, Nyoto and Sudisman17 would have made such a string of political blunders. Hence the suspicion naturally arises that this string was deliberately arranged to ensure the Movement’s failure. Announcements of the kind mentioned above merely confused the public, paralysed the masses, and provided easy pretexts for smashing the September 30th Movement itself. In this event, who really set up these bizarre announcements and arranged for their broadcast over national radio? 15 In 1948–49, the Dutch set up a series of puppet regimes in various provinces they controlled to offset the power and prestige of the independent Republic. Recomba was the name of this type of regime in Java, and Pasundan is the old name for the Sundanese-speaking territory of West Java. 16 The Movement proclaimed this Council as the temporary ruling authority in Indonesia, but its membership included right-wing generals, second-tier leftwingers, and various notoriously opportunist politicians, while omitting almost all figures with national reputations and large organizations behind them. 17 Secretary-General of the Communist Party. 14 nlr 3 Most of the main actors in, and key witnesses to, the crisis of 1965, have either died or been killed. Those who are still alive have kept their lips tightly sealed, for various motives: for example, Umar Wirahadikusumah, Omar Dhani, Sudharmono, Rewang, M. Panggabean, Benny Murdani, Mrs. Hartini, Mursyid, Yoga Sugama, Andi Yusuf and Kemal Idris.18 Now that thirty-five years have passed since 1965, would it not be a good thing for the future of the Indonesian nation if these people were required to provide the most detailed accounts of what they did and witnessed, before they go to meet their Maker? According to an old popular saying, the mills of God grind slowly but very fi ne. The meaning of this adage is that in the end the rice of truth will be separated from the chaff of confusion and lies. In every part of the world, one day or another, long-held classified documents, memoirs in manuscript locked away in cabinets, and diaries gathering dust in the attics of grandchildren will be brought to His mill, and their contents will become known to later generations. With this book of his, ‘shut away’ during twenty-one years of extraordinary suffering, Abdul Latief, with his astonishing strength, has provided an impressive exemplification of the old saying. Who knows, some day his accusations may provide valuable material for the script of that play in the repertoire of the National History Shadow-Theatre which is entitled . . . well, what else could it be?—Petrus Becomes King. In traditional Javanese shadow-theatre, Petruk Dadi Ratu is a rollicking farce in which Petruk, a well-loved clown, briefly becomes King, with predictably hilarious and grotesque consequences. For Petrus, read Killer—see note 12 above. Suharto notoriously saw himself as a new kind of Javanese monarch, thinly disguised as a President of the Republic of Indonesia. 18 Omar Dhani: Air Force chief in 1965, sentenced to death, had his sentence reduced to life imprisonment, and was recently released. Sudharmono: for decades close aide to Suharto. Rewang: former candidate member of the Communist Party’s Politbureau. Panggabean: top general in Suharto’s clique and his successor as commander of Kostrad. Hartini: Sukarno’s second wife in 1965. Mursyid: Sukarnoist general heading military operations for the Army Staff in 1965, subsequently arrested. Yusuf and Idris: both these generals played central roles in the overthrow of Sukarno. anderson: Indonesia 15

Punakawan, Parodi Jawa * Digiring penjajah "Jawa" - 27Agust-2004 * Reportase di Aceh - Apr-2003

2005-10-22T20:58:00.000-07:00

Menjadi "Jawa" di Aceh

2005-10-19T07:41:00.000-07:00

Aboeprijadi Santoso, 18 Oktober 2005 Adakalanya suatu kelompok etnik menjadi subyek historis yang amat dominan di negeri lain dengan kelompok etnik lain. Manakala negeri itu menjadi daerah konflik berkepanjangan dan rakyatnya jadi korbannya, maka wajar jika etnik dominan tsb menjadi bulan-bulanan – dia menjadi suatu simbol-target. Itulah yang terjadi dengan etnik Rusia dalam tragedi Baltik di bawah Uni Soviet. Seperti itu pula kisah “Jawa” bagi Aceh di bawah Belanda dan Orde Baru. Jawa=penjajah Anggap saja Aceh adalah sebuah laboratorium sosial-historis yang merekam “Jawa” sebagaimana dipandang oleh masyarakat lokal. Suka atau tidak, dalam persepsi Aceh, “Jawa” adalah sebuah simbol kuat yang mewakili sosok penjajah. Para pengamat Aceh tinggal membuka buku-buku sejarah tentang bagaimana Belanda bertingkah di Aceh dengan menggunakan serdadu Jawa. Sekarang pun, orang Aceh tak usah memilah-milah sejarah, mereka tinggal menengok de Petjoet Kerkhof, pekuburan di pusat kota Banda Aceh (satu satunya pemakaman di sentrum suatu ibukota di jagad ini). Di sana dapat ditemukan nama-nama Ambon, Manado, dsb, tapi yang terbanyak adalah nama serdadu Belanda dan Jawa. Zaman sekarang, idem dito. Orang tinggal membuka-buka koran-koran di masa Orde Baru, lagi-lagi nama-nama jenderal-jenderal dan serdadu Jawa menghiasi berita-berita tentang operasi ini dan operasi itu, sampai Operasi Jaring Merah (DOM 1989-98) yang membuat Aceh menjadi ladang bersimbah darah. Orang desa di Aceh tahu benar siapa yang menyuruh mereka berjemur atau berkubang berjam-jam bagai kerbau di sawah, merayap puluhan meter dengan siku, atau menjilati dinding untuk menghapus slogan “merdeka” dan “referendum” di tahun 1998-2000, dsb. Indonesia-Jawa Maka, ketika pasca-Soeharto, Aceh bangkit, saat Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) dan gerakan sipil bergolak, “Jawa” pun kembali menjadi simbol, praduga, stereotipe tentang sosok penjajah. Istilah “Indonesia-Jawa” menjadi pembeda antara Indonesia yang Jawa dan Indonesia yang lain. Ketua Delegasi RI dalam perundingan Helsinki, Menhukham Hamid Awaluddin sempat bercerita bahwa dalam sidang pertama RI-GAM selama berjam-jam dia harus mendengar protes dan keluhan Delegasi GAM tentang “penjajah Indonesia-Jawa”. “Nah, gue mau bilang ape, gue kan orang Bugis!” begitu konon Hamid mengeluh. Menurut hemat saya, Hamid kurang paham makna simbolisme dari umpatan GAM. Politik publikasi vs politik etnisisme Ketika meliput acara terbuka pertama peringatan ulangtahun GAM, Desember 1999, kami dibawa ke desa Teupin Raya, Pidie. Sejumlah wartawan lokal dan asing, kebanyakan non-Jawa, harus diperiksa pejabat GAM sebelum memasuki lapangan tempat upacara. Seorang wartawan Jakarta berseru kepada komandan GAM, “wah, ada Jawanya satu, Bang”. Rupanya koran Jakarta produk Orde Baru ini memainkan politik Machiavelisme-etnisisme dalam mengejar headline dengan mengirim wartawan-wartawan non-Jawa. Tapi si Panglima sagoe GAM tenang-tenang saja. “Ini kan Radio Nederland, bukan Jawa” katanya merekayasa dalih. Jadi, GAM yang mengejar publikasi mencari alasan pragmatis. Bagi GAM, politik publikasi akhirnya mengalahkan politik etnisisme. Tapi politik etnisisme tidak hanya monopoli Orde Baru dan GAM. Di Washington 2001, ada pertemuan aktivis yang tak boleh dihadiri mereka yang non-Aceh. Di Kuala Lumpur, 2003, ada konperensi Aceh dengan satu sesi khusus buat aktivis-aktivis asal Aceh. Seorang kolega dengan nama Jawa sering meliput Aceh tanpa repot karena dia kebetulan etnis Tionghoa. Warisan masa kolonial sampai Orde BaruTetapi, inti stereotipe “Jawa” di Aceh sebenarnya lahir dari garis panjang peran dominan aparat negara (kolonial sampai Orde Baru) yang menghadirkan peran kunci figur-figur Jawa. Di sini, politik etnisisme lahir dari persepsi-diri tentang sejarah hubungan antara kelompok sendiri dan kelompok dominan, yang berubah menjadi kelompok target. Ini tampak di Bosnia, tapi juga di Riau, Medan, dsb, di mana ratusan eks-transmigran Jawa terhempas dari Aceh Timur oleh politik pembersihan etnis oleh GAM dan mereka yang mengaku “GAM”. Mereka dijuluki “Anak Anak Soeharto”. Di sini, jelas, stereotipe “Jawa” lahir dari kekuasaan Orde Baru Soeharto dan dampaknya bagi Aceh. Politik etnisisme menjadi produk dari konflik masyarakat dan pusat negara. Selang lima tahun, GAM kewalahan di lapangan, sementara TNI - seperti Belanda di Indonesia dan ABRI di Timor Timur - tak berhasil mematahkan perlawanan lokal. Desember 2004, datang tsunami yang membawa karunia di balik musibah (blessing in disguise). RI dan GAM berdamai di Helsinki, Agustus 2005. Kini, giliran Jakarta berpolitik etnisis. Bukan kebetulan, tak satu pun delegasi RI ke Helsinki asal Jawa. Bukan etnisisme atau rasialismeLima tahun meliput konflik Aceh, keluar masuk desa-desa di Aceh Utara, Bireuen dan Meulaboh, saya menyimpulkan bahwa stereotipe tentang “Jawa” itu, meski cukup kuat, namun tak serta merta perlu dicap ‘etnisisme’ atau ‘rasialisme’. Dari banyak narasumber, teman-teman asal Aceh, GAM maupun yang bukan GAM, hampir tak ada yang memanggil saya dengan “Santoso”, sementara para aktivis dan kolega memanggil “Tossi”. Kebanyakan narasumber Aceh lebih suka menyapa “Aboe”, sedangkan sapaan “Aboe” biasanya diperuntukkan bagi orang tua yang disegani. Ini, tentu, tidak berlaku buat saya yang bukan Aceh dan bukan sesepuh. Menurut Murizal, kolega wartawan asal Aceh, sebutan “Aboe” adalah isyarat keakraban dan kehangatan. Rupanya, Aceh membuat saya tidak menjadi “Jawa” di Aceh. Jawa = korupsi kekuasaan Menjadi “Jawa” adalah memenuhi persyaratan dari persepsi lokal tentang Jawa, sebab “Jawa”, bagi Aceh, bukan sekadar etnik Jawa, melainkan (bagian dari) kekuasaan (sic!) Jawa. Dia bisa direpresentasikan oleh kekuasaan kolonial Belanda, Soekarno maupun Orde Barunya Soeharto. Singkatnya, “Jawa” di Aceh mewakili korupsi kekuasaan, termasuk pelanggaran besar HAM. Walhasil, terjadilah stereotipe anti-“Jawa” yang mengungkap simbol target sebagai produk historis Aceh dalam melawan penjajahan - tak perlu ada hubungannya dengan etnik atau pribadi yang kebetulan asal Jawa. © Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, all rights reserved

Perang & Damai Gaya Aceh

2005-10-17T07:02:00.000-07:00

TEMPO Edisi. 34/XXXIV/17 - 23 Oktober 2005 Kolom Perang & Damai Gaya Aceh Aboeprijadi Santoso · Wartawan Radio Nederland, kini di Aceh TEUKU Abeuek, Uleebalang (Ketua Wilayah) di Pameue, Aceh Barat, sudah lama jadi sumber kekesal-an penguasa Hindia-Belanda pada 1920-an. Dia dicurigai membantu logistik pemberontak, tapi selalu pintar mengelak tuduhan. ”Mengapa Teuku membantu orang-orang muslim dengan memberi makan?” Sang Teuku menjawab, ”Tuan harus mengerti, di Aceh tak seorang pun tamu keluar dari rumah dengan perut lapar. Itu adat Aceh. Saya wajib menghormati tamu dengan menyuguhkan nasi.” Berulang kali interogasi semacam itu terjadi, berulang kali Belanda kena batunya. Menolak alasan si Teuku bisa dikira tak peduli adat. Padahal, pemerintah kolonial tegak justru dengan cara dan legitimasi menjunjung adat. Pernah Tk. Abeuek menyindir dengan lembut: ”Tuan musti tahu, di negeri kami, para musafir kami ukur jarak dan lamanya mereka bepergian. Saya tak boleh ber-tanya apa dia seorang muslimin (pemberontak), apa bukan. Tapi, sebagai seorang beradab, saya wajib memberi bekal, bukan?” Lagi-lagi, bagi Belanda, yang mengaku mengemban ”misi peradaban”, ulah si Teuku ini menjengkelkan karena dilematis. Masalahnya, sudah keadaan damai kok masih bermain ”subversif”. Sebaliknya, bagi orang Aceh, mereka yang meneken Maklumat Korte Verklaring itu kan orang pe-nguasa saja. Takluk dan taat, bagi kaum muslimin (pemberontak, di mata Belanda) hanya kepada maklumat Allah-, bukan kepada manusia. Sejak perang panjang 1873, Aceh pada 1920-an mulai- mantap. Uleebalang, sebagai pejabat tinggi Belanda- dan tokoh yang disegani masyarakat lokal, tak boleh ditangkap- begitu saja. Balans politik kawasan bisa terancam di ujung tanduk. Maka harus dicari akal untuk menghabisi Tk. Abeuek, dan terpilihlah perwira dari satuan elite marrechausse, Letnan Infanteri J.H.J. Brendgen. Uniknya, Brendgen menyiapkan tugas dengan saksama. Diam-diam dia pergi ke Bandung, belajar ilmu pe-dang. Kembali ke Aceh, dia mengundang Tk. Abeuek ”ber-adu tangkas, menarikan pedang”. Tk. Abeuek kontan menyanggupi. ”Syaratnya, yang kalah harus mati,” usul Brendgen. ”Setuju!” Teuku menyahut, tegas. Duel pun berlangsung. Letnan Brendgen kagum melihat- Tk. Abeuek mengayun pedang. Lama berlaga, gelang ta--ngan Brendgen lemas. Pedangnya terpelanting. Tubuhnya terkulai, Brendgen mengaku kalah, ”Teuku, bunuhlah aku!” Tk. Abeuek menjawab, ”Ambil pedangmu!” Brendgen tetap minta dibunuh, dan si Teuku tetap menolaknya. Akhirnya, Tk. Abeuek mengajak Brendgen makan bersama rakyat. Di tengah kenduri besar, Brendgen bertanya ”Mengapa Teuku tak mau membunuhku?” Teuku menjawab, ”Karena Tuan tak mau ambil pedang.” Walhasil, duel dan kenduri itu berubah menjadi momentum perdamaian terhormat yang tak pernah terbayangkan sebelumnya. Brendgen menghormati kesepakatan kematian, dan Tk. Abeuek, selaku kesatria, puas: duel itu tak berakhir dengan membunuh lawan tak berdaya. Foto: Ramli.A.Dally Kisah nyata yang tersimpan lama di memori lokal itu kini marak, seperti dituturkan oleh Ramli A. Dally, mantan pegawai Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Aceh (PDIA), yang mendengarnya dari Brendgen sendiri, pada 1970-an. Brendgen belakangan dikenal menghormati dan mencintai- Aceh, fasih berbahasa Aceh, bahkan pandai ber-azan. Kini, di gerbang kuburan De Kerkhof, Banda Aceh, terukir ”J.H.J. Brendgen. Vriend van Atjeh” (sahabat Aceh), walau Brendgen sebenarnya dikubur di Belanda. Foto: Brendgen terukir di gerbang De Kerkhof Sekarang, kisah duel dan damai tadi dapat menjadi semacam model acuan bagi banyak orang Aceh untuk menafsirkan nota kesepahaman RI dan GAM di Helsinki, sekaligus untuk menguji pelaksanaannya. Moral cerita itu—bahwa suatu pertarungan sengit dapat berak-hir secara bermartabat—dapat menjadi panutan khalayak untuk menerima dan mengawasi pelaksanaan MoU Hel-sinki. Damai mini tanpa wasit ala Teuku Abeuek dan Brendgen tentu tak sama dengan MoU, namun keduanya menyiratkan bahwa hubungan konflik dapat berakhir ketika perdamaian tercapai secara bermartabat. Duel tadi, se-perti setiap pe-rang, merupakan momentum besar yang memacu masyarakat menjadi—dalam model sosiologi klasik Durkheim—semacam ”komuniti moral”. Di situ gengsi, moral, dan kepentingan mapan masing-masing pihak bersatu menjadi taruhan telanjang di hadap-an masyarakat. Wajar jika martabat perdamaian ala Tk. Abeuek dan Brendgen menjadi tolok ukur bagi martabat pelaksanaan perdamaian Helsinki. Itu pula bedanya duel Aceh dengan duel klasik Romawi atau duel Once Upon a Time in the West-nya Sergio Lionne, yang demi harga diri para petandingnya semata, tanpa melibatkan, dan tanpa hikmah, bagi masyarakat. Kebalikan damai mini tadi pernah terjadi pada 1980-an, ketika keluar ancaman di Pidie, ”Barang siapa memberi rokok kepada GAM akan dibunuh!” Tak mengheran-kan, dengan muatan segudang pelanggaran hak asasi, ungkapan ”Kemerdekaan tinggal rokok siebak teu!” (kemerdekaan tinggal sebatang rokok lagi) belakangan jadi populer di Aceh. Lelah oleh konflik 29 tahun plus tsunami, sekarang, pada detik-detik damai menuju berakhirnya militarisasi- Aceh, Desember 2005, Aceh—selaku komuniti politik dan komuniti moral—mendukung perdamaian Helsinki. Itu sebabnya, Aceh pantas bercermin pada Teuku Abeuek dan Letnan Brendgen, meski untuk masa kini perlu di-ingat -adanya ancaman ”milisi” maupun ”GAM liar”. Dengan kata lain, giliran para protagonis di lapangan dan politisi di Jakarta menjaga martabat diri sendiri, -dengan cara ikhlas menjaga komitmen Helsinki.

Cipok ala TNI

2005-09-30T05:47:00.000-07:00

Entah bagaimana etimologi, asal-usul kata itu, cium bibir dan seterusnya itu disebut “cipok”. Sekarang, kata itu jarang terdengar, meski, tentu, tak berarti jarang terjadi. Tapi, diam-diam, soal cium-mencium ini menjadi tanda-tanda zaman. Cipika dan cipiki, cium pipi kiri dan kanan di saat bertemu atau berpisah, menjadi kelaziman orang kota. Bahkan, di era digital ini, Anda bisa cipi-cipian teruuuus, setiap menit dan setiap jam, lewat “virtual kiss” yang tersedia di internet. Tapi, ketimbang cipokan maya, Anda pasti lebih suka cipi dan cipok beneran. Maka, soal cium-mencium pun jadi jamak di Indonesia. Ini cerita pergeseran suasana zaman. Di Prancis, yang, orangnya, bahasanya, bahkan sejarah politiknya, sering dianggap romantis, tak ada cerita cipika dan cipiki. Di Jerman, juga tak ada adat cipika-cipiki. Sebaliknya, di Belanda, mereka tak puas dengan dua kali cium pipi, tapi harus tiga kali -cipika, cipiki, dan cipika lagi. Baru baru ini, adat itu menjadi peristiwa nasional ketika Ratu Belanda Beatrix disambut cium tiga kali oleh seorang selebriti lokal. Di Lelystad, kota polder dekat Amsterdam, dia disambut penyanyi asal Maroko. Cium tiga kali sang penyanyi dan penari rapper tenar, Ali B kepada Ratu Belanda itu, menjadi simbol untuk mendorong re-konsiliasi multikultural, karena hubungan antar etnik di Belanda belakangan agak terganggu gara gara pembunuhan sineas Theo van Gogh oleh seorang ekstremis asal Maroko. Jadi, soal cium-mencium – sebagai isyarat keakraban, kehangatan dan kedamaian - rupanya cocok untuk dijadikan simbolik bagi tujuan-tujuan politik. Belum lama lalu, dalam kolom ini saya menulis betapa Soeharto, meski pun dia bekas diktator yang cemar, toh memperoleh cipi, cihi dan ciken - cium pipi, cium dahi dan cium kening, dari bekas kawan, bawahan, bahkan bekas lawannya, antara lain dari Wakil Ketua MPR A.M. Fatwa yang pernah dihukum Orde Baru belasan tahun penjara. Dan cium kening, diperolehnya dari presiden yang sekarang, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Semua itu, merupakan isyarat – isyarat loyalitas dari yang mencium terhadap yang dicium, tapi juga isyarat kepada publik bahwa hubungan antara keduanya itu masih penting. Jadi, ada nilai nilai tertentu yang hendak disampaikan. Dengan kata lain, soal cium-mencium seolah-olah tidak hanya jadi bagian dari ranah publik, tapi sudah jadi bagian ranah politik. Nah, seorang prajurit TNI, Eko namanya, baru baru ini dengan spontan mencium pacarnya, Yuni, gadis Aceh berjilbab, saat keduanya berpisah di pelabuhan Krueng Geukeuh, Lhoksemauwe. Kontan media massa ramai. Majalah Gatra menyambutnya sebagai hal yang wajar dan memasang judul “Tentara, asmara dan air mata”. Tapi suratkabar popular di Belanda, De Telegraaf, mengangkatnya sebagai insiden yang menghebohkan. “Ada heboh seputar ciuman panas,” katanya. Memang, ada asmara yang menggelora, dan di permukaan publik, ada kemarahan. Tapi, yang paling menarik bagi saya, adalah sikap publik di sekitar adegan cipok itu. Prajurit Eko dan Inong Yuni, jelas, tak peduli dunia sekitar. Sebaliknya, publik sekitar amat peduli terhadap ulah pasangan tsb. Publik yang terdiri dari kolega-kolega Eko memandang Eko dan Yuni dengan penuh perhatian, ingin tahu dan mung-kin juga dengan cemburu. Mereka sama sekali tidak marah, malah amat toleran terhadap adegan privat di muka publik itu. Bahkan, publik tetap senyum ketika bos mereka, sang Pangdam, Mayjen Supiadin, memperingatkan prajurit Eko. Anehnya, reaksi reaksi yang muncul memperlihatkan kemarahan publik. Sang Pangdam marah, dan atas nama korpsnya, dia minta maaf kepada publik. Di kalangan TNI, ulah tsb rupanya sudah dianggap biasa, lumrah. Di Nisam, Aceh Utara, April 2004 saya pernah mewawancarai seorang komandan setempat, sementara di belakang di tangsi itu, saya dengar suara adegan panas, “lebih seru” ketimbang cipokannya Eko dan Yuni. Selain itu, jelas, toleransi dan wajah gembira para prajurit itu juga mencerminkan suasana perdamaian di Aceh, yang memungkinkan mereka pulang kampung. Maka, saya menyimpulkan, kemarahan Pangdam Mayjen Supiadin itu tampaknya cuma basa basi belaka buat publik lokal, bukan marah beneran kepada anakbuahnya. Jadi, cipokan Eko-Yuni adalah sebuah “pemberontakan kecil” terhadap polisi-susila. Apa yang terjadi tampaknya adalah semacam batu ujian: seberapa jauhkah cipok Eko-Yuni itu akseptabel untuk dilakukan di muka umum. Kalau di dunia Barat, batas itu makin hilang, di dunia Asia, harus diuji-coba terus sampai di mana batas toleransi publik. Tapi, jangan lupa, “pemberontakan” Eko yang beragam TNI, dan Yuni yang berjilbab itu, tak sulit mereka lakukan karena TNI punya privilese hanya tunduk pada hukum militer, jadi Eko pun akan bebas dari hukum cambuknya polisi Syariah. Lantas bagaimana nasib Inong Yuni yang ditinggal? Kok sang Pangdam, publik dan media massa diam sazha?

Aceh, 'Persatean' 1965, dan NKRI

2005-09-25T09:39:00.000-07:00

Oleh Aboeprijadi Santoso Ada yang aneh bin ganjil di bulan September 2005 ini. Kontroverse soal MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) atau persetujuan damai Acehdi Helsinki, 15 Agustus, mulai meredup menjelang akhir September -tepat 40 tahun Peristiwa G30S yang menghasilkan aib bangsa dantragedi kemanusiaan terbesar Indonesia. Namun, dalam pemberitaanmedia massa, soal Aceh dan Peristiwa 1965 tak pernah dikaitkan,seolah-olah samasekali tak ada hubungannya. Padahal, tanpa tragedi 1965-66, Orde Baru tak akan tegak. Tanpa OrdeBaru, kemelut Aceh tak akan separah itu. Dengan kata lain, adapelembagaan ideologi Orde Baru -`missing link' - yang menghubungkankeduanya. Kebanyakan kritik terhadap perdamaian Aceh kedengarannya munafik,dan mencerminkan schizofrenia dan paranoid yang melekat pada gayanasionalisme Indonesia masa kini.Banyak kekuatan politik dan publik takut, Aceh bakal lepas dari NKRImelalui partai lokal, padahal tahun 1950an kita sudah mengenalpartai-partai lokal tanpa meributkan soal kesatu-an. Ada yangkhawatir akan federalisme, padahal kenyataan negeri ini sudahsemacam semi-federal atau `negara kesatuan-pura-pura'. Lhaa, siapayang memberi otonomi, dan siapa dan bagaimana cara mengontrolotonomi di tangan 400an bupati (Suharto-Suharto Kecil) di seluruhNusantara tanpa mekanisme kontrol tertentu? Lagi pula, mana adapropinsi meraih 70% penghasilan daerah, yang bahkan di AmerikaSerikat ("mbahnya federalisme", dalam istilah Christianto Wibisono)pun mustahil. Ada pula yang tak bisa tidur, takut hantu Van Mook akan membuatIndonesia buyar, padahal Presiden Sukarno sudah lama mengubur mitositu dengan membubarkan RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat) pada 1950.Ada yang cemas karena hak Aceh untuk menetapkan suku bunga dapatmengancam ekonomi Indonesia, padahal MoU tidak menyebut Aceh berhakpunya bank sentral sendiri. Lalu, ada yang cemburu, ingin otsus(Jawa Timur, Sulsel, Riau, Bali), padahal sudah disepakati hanya adatiga daerah istimewa/otsus – Yogyakarta, Aceh dan Papua. Kritik-kritik paranoid itu mengandung tiga unsur dasar yang sama. Pertama, ketiganya samasekali tidak mempersoalkan ihwal yang palingpokok bagi Aceh: perang dan damai. Artinya, mereka tak pedulikenyataan perang yang amat menyakiti Aceh mau pun kenyataan damaiyang amat didambakan Aceh. Ini bermakna mengabaikan kepentingan Acehyang dilanda dua macam 'tsunami': konflik dan perang ganas selama 29tahun yang melibas kehidupan dan hak-hak asasi rakyat sipil Aceh,dan musibah alam tsunami. Para pengritik MoU tak mau menarik pelajaran berharga bahwaPerdamaian Helsinki merupa-kan upaya damai - suatu solusi politikdiikuti de-militarisasi - yang pertama dalam sejarah Indonesia dalammenyelesaikan masalah regional dan separatisme. Bagi Indonesia pasca-Suharto yang terbebani warisan Orde baru,solusi Aceh itu amat penting dan dapat merintis perubahan bagiIndonesia. Sebab, untuk kali pertama, terjadi de-militarisasi yangsignifikan (dari 41.000 menjadi 14.000 TNI) di sebuah daerahkonflik. Dalam hal ini, kesediaan TNI dan Brimob untuk mundur, danGAM untuk menyerahkan senjata, layak dihargai. Lalu, apakah parapengritik itu juga tak peduli sambutan positif rakyat Aceh sejauhini, selama bulan pertama penyerahan senjata GAM dan penarikan TNInon-organik dan Brimob? Kalau tidak, ya "silahkan kalau mau perangsendiri," ujar Jusuf Kalla, perintis Helsinki, mengingatkan secaraimplisit bahwa Megawati-lah yang mengingkari janji untuk tidakmeneteskan darah di bumi Tanah Rencong. Kedua, menginginkan otsus seperti Aceh menandakan bahwa parapengkritik MoU tidak memahami daerah-konflik seperti Aceh dan Papua.Menuntut keistimewaan otsus Aceh berarti melupakan kenyataan pokokbahwa Aceh sebenarnya tak pernah menikmati "keistimewaan" itu.Mereka melupakan luka pertama Aceh ketika PM Ir. Djuanda pada 1952menjadikan Aceh bagian propinsi Sumatra Utara. Pemerintahan Djuandamengingkari janji dan tangis Presiden Sukarno di muka Abu DaudBeureu'eh dalam pertemuan historis di Hotel Atjeh di Kuta Radja pada1948. Aceh menderita justru karena "keistimewaan"nya tidak istimewa,dan disusul ketimpangan bagi hasil sumberdaya dan konflik berdarahyang panjang. Singkatnya, orang lupa bahwa Aceh telah menderita kerugian besarsecara material dan bathin semasa Orde Baru. Hanya satu kritikmenohok secara tepat: Kwik Kian Gie menyebut MoU itusemacam "pampasan perang" – analog dengan Jepang pasca PD-II - yangharus dibayar Jakarta kepada Aceh. Sayang, Kwik lupa, selainmembayar pampasan, para penjahat perang Jepang diseret ke TribunalTokio. Lalu, bagaimana dengan penjahat HAM Jakarta semasa DOM (1989-1998) dan setelahnya? Ketiga, kecuali kalangan TNI, kritik-kritik itu lupa bahwa MoUHelsinki dapat mengancam bisnis militer, yang selama ini merugikankas negara karena menguasai sektor ekonomi informal - daripembalakan liar, penyelundupan sampai perdagangan ganja di Aceh -yang bakal terdesak di bawah pemerintahan-sendiri Aceh kelak. Namun, paling menarik, kritik-kritik terhadap MoU pada dasarnyabersumber dari persepsi ideologis warisan Orde Baru, yang utamanyamelihat NKRI sebagai entitas teritorial, dan, karena itu, masalahAceh dilihat sebagai masalah teritorial, ketimbang sebagai masalahkeadilan, hak dan identitas lokal. Dalam bahasa sederhana: Orde Barusuka (hasil bumi) Aceh, tapi tak suka orang Aceh (idem dito Papua). Akibatnya, masalah Aceh selalu dilihat sebagai soal TNI versus GAMbelaka. Menarik, hal ini bahkan diakui oleh Wiryono S, diplomat RIyang berunding dengan GAM pada 2002. Obsesi dan paranoide teritori itu, selain merujuk pada kepentingannegara pada hasil bumi dan sumberdaya daerah, pada dasarnya,bersumber dari pengkeramatan - sakralisasi - yang terjadi padalembaga negara di bawah Orde Baru. Negara dan segala atributnya,simbol, kelembagaan, kepemimpinan, aparat, termasuk wilayah, telahdikeramatkan. Bahkan amandemen konstitusi tak boleh melebihi 37pasal karena UUD 45 pasalnya sebanyak itu. Di bawah Suharto, negaraotoriter militeristis, pada 1980an, cenderung totaliter denganmembangun hegemoni, yang hendak dilestarikan dengan mengkeramatkan atribut-atribut negara. Pengkeramatan atribut, simbol dan misi alat negara - "Dari Sabang sampai Merauke", Panca Sila, UUD 1945 dst - menjadi mantra-mantradari doktrin dan dogma Orde Baru yang menciptakan sebuah konstruksidan wacana bernama "NKRI" - bukan negara kesatuan RI yang dicintaipara warga pecinta dan patriot Indonesia, melainkan suatu wacana –alur-alur berpikir - yang mengutamakan kesatuan teritori sebagaiprimat di atas segalanya – bahkan, juga di atas keselamatan dankebahagiaan manusia dan kelompok-kelompok bangsa, demi kesatuan danjati-diri yang seragam dan tunggal. Akibatnya, misalnya, panji-panji seperti "Cinta Damai Tapi LebihCinta Negara Kesatuan" di tengah konteks Aceh yang dilanda konflikdan tsunami, telah membuat orang Aceh bosan dan kesal, sehinggaretorika itu menjadi hampa dan kontraproduktif. Ini saya saksikan diMeulaboh dan banyak tempat di Aceh pasca-tsunami. Idem-dito pos-posmiliter sepanjang jalan raya Medan-Banda Aceh semasa Darurat Militer2003-04. Walhasil, mantra-mantra "NKRI" yang doktriner itu menggembosipatriotisme Indonesia. Ironis, bukan, bahwa orang menyangka bahwa,dengan mudah curiga dan berseru "berantas separatisme", akanmenciptakan patriot-patriot. Persis kebalikannya, itu malahmenggembosi persatuan karena retorika itu samasekali tidak menjawabprotes-protes sah terhadap kesewenangan dan ketidakadilan mau punmasalah-masalah daerah. Bukankah Bung Hatta pernah memperingatkan, janganbiarkan "persatoean" ini menjadi "persatean". Ternyata, persateanbesar 1965-66 malah melahirkan Orde Baru dengan hegemoni ideologisdan pengkeramatan negara itu, yang ekornya kembali menghasilkansejumlah persatean lain di Timor Timur, Aceh dan Papua.Orde Baru - tepatnya TNI/ABRI, Seskoad, Kodam Siliwangi sejak 1964 –sudah menyiapkan paradigma sendiri, dengan menggusuristilah "buruh", "Tionghoa", "demonstrasi", "revolusi", danmenggantinya dengan "karyawan", "Cina", "unjuk rasa", "pembangunan",dsb. Di bawah hegemoni Orde Baru, istilah-istilah itu bukan sekadarsemantik, melainkan bagian dari pembentukan wacana, alias alur-alurberpikir politik, secara totaliter. Lahir dan berkembang-nya maknasuatu kata dan konsep, menurut filsuf Wittgenstein, sesuai asasverbal valent usu - makna pemakaiannya – adalah suatu 'game',permainan, yang sangat dipengaruhi konteks sosial-politik, apalagidi bawah rezim cenderung totaliter. Begitu juga konsep yang menjadi legitimasi masa kini, yakni "NKRI".Orang lupa, negara ini lahir tahun 45 sebagai R.I, republik yangsatu, bersatu dengan makna persatuan, bukan kesatuan. Orde Baru-lahyang memperkenalkan wacana "kesatuan" yang bermakna unit ataukesatuan dalam bahasa militer - bukan "unity" atau "united" dalamarti persatuan seperti dimaknai oleh Soekarno dan Hatta dan generasipendiri republik ini. Konsepsi "kesatuan" untuk menggantikan nilaipersatuan sebagai perekat negara, hanya terjadi semasa Orde Baru. Walhasil, berkat wacana totaliter Orde Baru, berkat orientasiteritorial yang menggantikan orientasi kemanusiaan dan keadilan,setiap aspirasi kedaerahan mudah dianggap "separatis", akhirnya,lahirlah separatisme beneran, yang dijawab dengan persatean. Tapi,karena sang aparat merupakan bagian dari mantra keramat danmempunyai misi menjaga kesatuan yang keramat, maka segala persateankeji demi misi yang keramat itu pun menjadi benar. Dari sini-lah lahir impunitas bagi semua pelanggaran HAM – di TimorTimur 1999, Abepura, Papua, 2000, di Aceh semasa DOM dst.Menteri Pertahanan semasa Presiden Gus Dur, Mahfud, pernahmengungkap adanya 'deal' bahwa, pasca 1998, para jendral itu setujusaja demokratisasi, asal mereka tidak dihukum karena pelanggaran HAMdi masa lalu di saat bertugas "demi NKRI". Gus Dur sendiri akhirnyaterjungkal, antara lain, karena dicurigai membahayakan kesatuanteritorial NKRI. Jadi, "NKRI" tidak lagi merujuk pada negara kesatuan, melainkanmenjadi legitimasi bagi suatu rezim. Konsekuensinya, Suharto selamatdari sanksi hukum karena rezimnya-lah yang mengkeramatkan misikeramat aparatnya "demi NKRI". Tepat, Sobron Aidit menyebutSuharto "diktator paling beruntung dan berbahagia". 'Deal' serupaterjadi di Cile, tapi setelah beberapa tahun dicabut parlemen danAugusto Pinochet kini mulai digugat atas kejahatan HAM rezimnya. Sakralisasi alat dan atribut negara adalah bunga-bunga, dan bagian,dari nasionalisme. Ben Anderson menunjuk, nasionalisme adalahideologi yang "tidak memiliki ideologi", maksudnya, bisa dipakaioleh siapa saja, dari sayap kiri sampai kanan. Kita melihat NKRItidak hanya menjadi mantra Orde Baru, tapi juga didukung parapenentang Orde Baru, termasuk banyak kalangan sayap kiri di dalamdan luar negeri. Saya pernah terkejut, mendengar beberapaorang "klayaban" berbicara soal Aceh, sama galaknya dengan JendralRyamirzad Ryacudu dan PDI-P. Dalam istilah Pramoedya Ananta Toer,ini namanya ironi "Orde Baru Baru". Dengan kata lain, orang gagal memahami bahwa "NKRI" - yaituIndonesia sebagai unit militer yang berideologi dan berjati-diritunggal dan seragam - adalah bagian dari wacana totaliter.Akibatnya, secara intelektual, mereka pun terjebak menjadi pendukungOrde Baru, meski retorikanya bisa saja sebaliknya. Mengenang 40 tahun G30S, dengan tragedi persateannya, adalah sebuahironi tersendiri. Peristiwa itu belum terbongkar tuntas, stigmanyamasih tersisa kuat, rehabilitasi hak-hak sipil para korban tetapterabaikan, dan tragedinya tak pernah diakui resmi sebagai aibbangsa - semua itu tersimpan menjadi trauma dan amnesia publik.Tanggal 1 Oktober boleh saja diresmikan sebagai Hari Kesaktian PancaSila (lihat pengkeramatan lagi), tapi konsep `kesaktian' mencerminkan suatu kemenangan, bukan suatu pengakuan negara atas tragedi bangsa yang harus diselesaikan. Upaya damai Aceh adalah sebuah halaman baru dari perjalanan panjangsejak persatean besar 1965-66, yang memungkinkan hegemoni ideologinegara Orde Baru. Reaksi-reaksi terhadap Persetujuan Helsinki adalahsalah satu imbasnya. Panjang nian, memang, ekor itu … Sumber: digubah dari kolom penulis, Radio Nederland, 23 sept. 2005 http://www2.rnw.nl/rnw/id/spesial/kolom_ranesi/kolom_as_aceh_1965_050922?

2005-09-14T05:55:00.000-07:00

Aceh 1998 - 2000: biarkan seribu bunga mekar (let thousands of flowers blossom) ...

2005-09-14T05:53:00.000-07:00

Aceh ... DOM, DM, lalu?

2005-09-14T05:52:00.000-07:00

Aceh, ... sudah berlalu?

2005-09-14T05:50:00.000-07:00

Pangdam I.M. Brigjen Supiadin & bekas tokoh GAM Amni Marzuki

Imbalan Ragam Buat GAM, Siapa Peduli Kiri?

2005-09-14T04:56:00.000-07:00

Imbalan Ragam Buat GAM, Siapa Peduli Kiri? (Coming up at www.ranesi.nl, klik jelajah nusantara) Nota Kesepahaman Helsinki, 15 Agustus yl, tidak hanya menjanjikan perdamaian bagi Aceh, namun juga macam macam imbalan bagi para bekas anggota Gerakan Aceh Merdeka GAM. Amnesti diberikan, reintegrasi diupayakan, dan lahan-lahan pertanian disediakan bagi GAM. Tapi GAM hanyalah salah satu dari kekuatan yang pernah menjadi musuh sengit Orde Baru. Bagaimana dengan bekas musuh serta para korban Orde Baru lainnya, khususnya bekas sayap kiri Indonesia yang terdampar di Eropa? Mereka yang oleh Gus Dur disebut “pejuang kemerdekaan klayaban” semuanya menyambut gembira kedamaian di Aceh, namun menggugat amnesti dan imbalan tsb, sebagai “tidak adil”. Cut Husein Fatly, 85 th, salah satu pendiri Partai Komunis Indonesia Cabang Aceh (1956), kini di Amsterdam, mengingatkan, “kami-lah korban pertama (Orde Baru). Sejuta dari kami tewas… Tak seujung rambut pun orang boleh mengganggu dari Sabang sampai Merauke karena rakyat Aceh ikut Revolusi 1945 itu,” katanya. Tom Iljas, 66 th, bekas mahasiswa di Beijing asal Painan, Sumatra Barat, kini terdampar di Stockholm, Swedia. Amnesti dan imbalan bagi GAM itu, bagi kami “menyakitkan,” ujar Tom yang pernah ikut berkampanye melawan pemberontakan PRRI di Padang. Seperti ratusan rekannya, Tom Iljas kehilangan paspornya. Hak hak sipil mereka dicabut sejak Presiden Gus Dur gagal mengupayakan pemulihan hak hak tsb pada 2000. “Itu gara gara Yusril (Menteri Kehakiman & HAM semasa Gus Dur, Yusril Ihza Mahendra),” jelas Wijanto, eksil di Woerden, Belanda, yang juga ahli hukum, yang mengatakan bahwa Yusril tidak menindak-lanjutinya, meski pun dia (Yusril) mengakui bahwa pencabutan paspor mereka itu tidak sah”. Pencabutan paspor tsb terjadi sejak April 1966 (setelah Surat 11 Maret 1966) ketika para Atase Militer RI mengambil-alih Kedutaan Besar RI di Cina dan di negara negara Blok Soviet. Mereka yang menolak menandatangani kesetiaan pada Jendral Soeharto sejak itu kehilangan hak hak sipil mereka – sampai sekarang. Francisca Fangidaey, 80 th, eksil di Zeist, Belanda, mengharapkan Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, paling sedikit, membuka dialog dan merehabilitasi hak hak mereka. Ibu Sisca, pejuang militan di tahun 1940an, menyambut perdamaian di Aceh, tetapi “kaget”, merasa haknya diingkari ketika mendengar GAM diberi amnesti. “Soal soal yang lain, tentang hak partai atau harta benda kami, itu soal kedua, tidak penting. Yang utama, paspor dan hak hak kami!” Dengarkan suara mereka dalam program kami Jelajah Nusantara (Klik www.ranesi.nl). Sobron Aidit, eksil di Paris, penyair dan adik Ketua PKI D.N. Aidit, menunjuk, “kami ini diperlakukan bukan sebagai orang. Kami belum jadi orang, bung! Ke Indonesia itu tidak merasa mudik, tapi datang,” katanya. Menurut Sobron, dengan sendirinya hak hak kami harus dipulihkan semuanya, paspor, harta benda sampai hak berpartai. Dengarkan suara Sobron Aidit dalam Jelajah Nusantara (Klik www.ranesi.nl)

2005-09-12T07:16:00.000-07:00

Outdated symbols, justified spirit

2005-09-12T06:57:00.000-07:00

Watch "mereka yang bertaring" (those with extra teeths); in East Timor they used those bastard teeths as "proxies" and called them "the militias"...!

2005-09-11T11:15:00.000-07:00

My best ally - not least for Amsterdam-Hilversum vice versa

Aceh deal left the Left out in the cold

2005-09-10T18:04:00.000-07:00

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/indonesian-studies/message/4782 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/indonesian-studies Aceh deal left the Left out in the cold By Aboeprijadi Santoso, Amsterdam. The amnesty offered to GAM (Free Aceh Movement) rebels following theHelsinki peace accord - indeed, that accord itself - is a case of reconciliation between post-authoritarian Indonesia and one former adversary. For the first time, a deal has been stroked with one of New Order's fiercest enemies and victims. However, Suharto political machinery's biggest victim is still the forgotten political left ofthe sixties - at home and exiled. In Europe, the exiles are at pain to learn that GAM rebels, who had fought against the state they helped found, defend and still love, have received amnesty and regained civil rights, which they could only long for. "No one should touch the existing state of Indonesia from Sabang toMerauke because the Acehnese were not spectators, but took part inthe revolutionary struggle of 1945," said `Bahrum Salman'. Bahrum's real identity, he disclosed to Radio Netherlands, is Cut Husein Fatly of Tapaktuan, one of the three Acehnese who set up the first Aceh branch of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1956. His comrades were killed in the mid-sixties as were his wife and 11 other women in whatwas known as Aceh Gerwani (PKI women movement) massacre. Cut left for China in 1964 and moved to Amsterdam in 1980. At 85, he retains his nationalistic fervor, helps promoting Indonesian dances in Europe and proudly celebrated the 60th independence-day at the Ambassador's residence in Wassenaar. For Cut, Hasan M. di Tiro's GAM is no different from Daud Beureu'eh's Darul Islam. "They wanted to change this state, so I resisted." Like the late poet Agam Wispi, he belong to the old guard of Acehnese defenders of Indonesian nationalism. Given the agony they went through since 1965, virtually all exilespredictably find Jakarta's deal with GAM "unjust" to them. Said CutHusein, "we were the first victim (of the Army). A million of us hadbeen killed!" He welcomes the peace, but warns "don't let theAcehnese be intimidated by the GAM and killed by the Army. Let them think freely." Tom Iljas, 66, another exile from West Sumatra living in Stockholm,is also upset. A young man from Painan, he joined campaign against the PRRI regional rebellion in the mid-fifties. The local authorities were impressed and recommended him for a scholar-ship to study inChina. His only "sin" was apparently that he joined the pro-Sukarno student organization (PPI) in Beijing – thus, he lost his Indonesian citizenship. As GAM rebels returning to the society with some rewards, Tom said, he welcomes the peace "with pain". "I'm jealous because they took arm, yet become normal, respectable citizens. We didn't take arm,(but) our rights were robbed without being tried. No rebels were treated like us. Look at (PRRI leader Col.) Ahmad Husein, the state facilitated his business." An Indonesian diplomat in Stockholm said "may be you should first take arm and rebel." That's "a cynical joke," said Tom, who often met with GAM leaders in the city but keeps a distance because "we are on different sides." Francisca Fangidaey, 80, another exile with undoubted patrioticcredentials, is "astonished" about Jakarta's deal with GAM. Itmeans, "we, the exiles, are regarded as traitors, that hurts medeeply." A Dutch educated Floresian woman, who "felt Dutch andthought completely in Dutch (when the Dutch ban Malay)," Francisca said, "the first Indonesian words I learned were Bung Karno, BungHatta and merdeka (freedom)." She became a heroin of independence waras she joined young militants in Java and sought supports abroad.Now living in Zeist, the Netherlands, Ibu Sisca hopes President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration will bring changes. "Openinga dialog and returning our passports are the least he should do tous," she said, adding that other issues like indemnification and political party are "of secondary importance". The agony of being left out in the cold is related to the Cold Warthat is apparently far from over at home. At the same time, unlike the GAM, they have nothing to bargain with – no arms, no guerilla's,no territory, no homeland, no tsunami. It's a hard reality for the exiles, whom President Abdurrachman `GusDur' Wahid once called "the wandering freedom fighters". As the three cases above show, they are remaining loyal and emotionally attached to their country, but have practically lost a homeland and theircivil rights at that. It reflects the traumatic legacy of the mid-sixty killings and persecutions that remains unresolved. A few hundreds of exiles across Europe lost their citizenships upon refusing to sign loyalty to Gen.Soeharto, April 1966, after the military attaches took over R.I.embassies in China and former Soviet bloc. Most R.I. presidents had since asked them to return home, with Gus Dur being the only one, whotried to help them regain their rights, but failed. "That's because of Yusril," said Wijanto, an exiled lawyer in Utrecht, the Netherlands, pointing out that then Minister of JusticeYusril Ihza Mahendra had actually obstructed President Gus Dur's instruction despite Yusril's own acknowledgment that the revocation of their passports was unlawful. Meanwhile, critics said, leftwing exiles tend to be more interestedin their own issues. While enthusiastic about Asia-African solidarities during the sixties, they oddly took for granted NewOrder's brutal occupation of East Timor – except a few like Umar Said and J.J. Kusni in Paris, who helped found Europe's first pro-Timor movement. Thus, a narrowed nationalistic spirit among many has misled "patriotic" views on East Timor, Aceh and Papua. Ironically,this has strengthened the very discourse of the New Order apparatuses that continue to frame and perceive the problems in terms of separatism, territorial integrity and war. In reality, the issues reflect a complex nexus of injustice, human dignity and collective identity - in addition to vital resources. Just as it is a principled matter to respect the legitimate rights ofall New Order victims, it's important to review the discourse of state-nationalism as a legacy of Suharto's New Order. One needs, that is, to conceptually deconstruct the N.K.R.I.discourse – the unitary state with the "K" from Kesatuan (unit) being the militaristic-turned-sacred concept – in order to revive the original, pluralist discourse of "R.I" (Republic of Indonesia) that gave birth to this nation-state sixty years ago. The writer is a journalist with Radio Netherlands.

PPI Belanda - Commemorating Munir -A Release

2005-09-10T17:56:00.000-07:00

http://www.ppibelanda.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=1

PPI Belanda

Commemorating Munir -A Release Thursday, 08 September 2005

The one-year commemoration of Munir’s death was held by the Indonesian Students Association (PPI) in the Netherlands at LAK Theatre (Lipsius Building), Leiden University. At 3.15 pm local time, the event started with the screening of the documentary “Garuda’s Deadly Upgrade” created by Australia’s SBS and Indonesia’s Off Stream.

It was attended by around 100 people. The audience was composed of Indonesian students from different cities in the Netherlands and Europe, the Indonesian community in the Netherlands, some Indonesian activists, as well as some Dutch and other foreign students.

After the documentary show, a panel discussion took place. Five speakers took part in a one-hour presentation and discussion. Farah Karimi, a member of the Dutch Parliament from GroenLinks, stated that the Dutch government should share responsibility in solving Munir’s assassination case. “This [tragedy] is a great dismay, not only for the Indonesian people, but also for the Dutch,” said she.

According to Karimi, the reason the Dutch government should also bear responsibility to help unravel this case is not merely due to the historical tie between the two countries. “Since it is a human rights issue, even in normal situation it is still important for the Dutch to pay attention to this case.” Karimi continued that Munir’s murderer must be found; all who are responsible for the killing must be punished. “Impunity may not win,” stated Karimi. In her capacity as a parliamentarian, Karimi promised to monitor the case very closely and asked the audience to keep informing her about the development of this case so that she could put pressure on the Dutch government.

Gerry Van Klinken, a researcher and an editorial advisor for Inside Indonesia noted that Munir was the only single person who could change public opinion in Indonesia toward the Indonesian army (TNI). It was Munir who fought relentlessly to expose the kidnapping of activists during the 1997 -1998 period by some members of the Indonesian Special Army Force (Kopassus). At that time, a military court finally sentenced two generals, one of which is now being suspected to have connection to Munir’s assassination.

In addition, Gerry expressed optimism that the real perpetrators behind Munir’s death would eventually be prosecuted. He specifically referred to the case in Chile in which Pinochet was promised immunity from prosecution under Chilean law. However, current development showed that even the General could not evade punishment forever.

The third speaker was Agung Putri, an activist from ELSAM (Lembaga Studi Advokasi Masyarakat). She praised Munir as a human rights activist who knew when to seize the opportunity to advance human rights cause. She pointed out the work of Munir to reopen the Tanjung Priok case, which after almost 15 years remained unresolved. Putri testified, “Munir was a very humble person, even though he was already considered a celebrity.” During her work, however, she disagreed with the way Munir looked at human rights violation cases, i.e. mainly from a legal point of view. “In analyzing human rights cases, socio-economic and political aspects must also be considered,” said Putri.

Further, she suggested that the investigation on Munir’s death should start to pay more attention to civilian institutions, i.e. Garuda Airlines. “I believe a more thorough scrutiny on Garuda is crucial,” asserted Putri.

Another speaker, Arnold Kohen from the International Humanitarian Project, Washington, D.C., proposed that people around the world should work harder in carrying out international campaign to assure significant progress in Munir’s murder case. He agreed with van Klinken on the issue of impunity in that in today’s cyber world, international solidarity was much easier to establish and maintain; and thus, impunity to repudiate. He suggested that to keep up the pressure on the Indonesian government to solve the mystery surrounding Munir’s death, global networking with the means of the Internet was essential. “At the end of the day, you could get more things done.”

The last speaker, Aboeprijadi Santoso, brought up some topics that until now only circulated among journalists. Santoso claimed that there might be actors other than Pollycarpus whom should also be investigated. He pointed at four passengers with false identity on board Garuda 974 who might present new findings to solving Munir’s murder case. Quite in contradiction, Santoso also said that the new government led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono would face difficulty in unraveling this case. “[Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] is relying too heavily on Syamsir Siregar (now the head of BIN) who may be competent, but can do nothing much inside the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), because he’s a new guy there,” said Santoso.

The event ended with the reading of an open statement by the Indonesian Student Association (PPI) in the Netherlands. The open statement was also signed by Inside Indonesia, KONTRAS (the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence), several Dutch parliamentarians, Stichting Sapu Lidi, several NGOs, and other participants who demanded a deeper investigation to reveal the mastermind behind Munir’s assassination.

Leiden, September 5, 2005PPI Leiden

Desivilisasi New Orleans dan Sivilisasi Aceh

2005-09-10T16:59:00.000-07:00

Desivilisasi New Orleans dan Sivilisasi Aceh Kolom Aboeprijadi Santoso, 9 September 2005 Seorang sejarawan Inggris baru-baru ini menulis dalam harian The Guardian tentang apa yang disebutnya “decivilization”. Timothy Garton Ash mengingatkan dalam kolomnya agar dunia Barat janganlah takabur. Apa sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan dengan desivilisasi itu? Desivilisasi New Orleans Menurut Timothy Garton musibah Katrina membuat kita semakin insyaf bahwa di bawah lapisan keberadaban kita, sebenarnya ada kebiadaban tersembunyi. Sesekali, dia muncul, seperti di kala musibah di New Orleans. Tidak hanya itu, katanya. Bukankah penjarahan, pemerkosaan, dan teror bersenjata yang terjadi di New Orleans itu, juga terjadi di Eropa yang manis dan beradab ini? Baru 60 tahun silam, kita menatap Tragedi Besar Holocaust, kebiadaban di Napoli tahun 1944, dan baru 10 tahun lalu kita menyaksikan tragedi serupa di Bosnia. Maka dia menyimpulkan: Eropa yang sekarang ini sebenarnya adalah produk dari sejumlah musibah buatan orang, man-made disasters. Yang menarik, sejarawan ini tidak merumuskan ‘peradaban’ itu sebagai suatu keadaan yang statis dan final, di suatu tempat, di suatu saat, belaka. Peradaban atau “civilization”, baginya, adalah suatu proses besar. Jadi, kebalikan dari peradaban bukan “kebiadaban”, melainkan proses kebalikannya, yaitu “de-civilization”. Kita sebut saja “desivilisasi”. Dengan kata lain, desivilisasi adalah rentetan kejadian dan kehidupan tak beradab, yang terjadi akibat musibah alam mau pun musibah politik alias buatan manusia. Dalam proses desivilisasi itu, manusia berhenti menjadi manusia, dan berubah menjadi biadab. Tapi proses aib ini bukan sesuatu yang banyak absen, dan cuma sesekali muncul, melainkan selalu hadir - dia hadir di bawah selaput keberadaban yang manis itu. Timothy Garton Ash, tentu saja, berbicara semata-mata tentang peradaban Barat dan membanding-bandingkan antar kasus di dalam ranah peradaban Barat menyusul tragedi banjir pasca-Katrina di New Orleans. Tetapi, tanpa disadarinya, sebenarnya dia berbicara tentang aib-aib besar Orde Baru dan pasca-Orde Baru – sejak Tragedi Besar 1965-66, Timor Timur, Aceh, Mei 1998, tapi juga musibah tsunami dst. Badai Katrina sudah banyak diramalkan, penguasa setempat sempat mengevakuasi ratusan ribu penduduk tepi pantai dua hari menjelang badai. Tanpa disangka, lima hari kemudian bendungan-bendungan jebol, dan datanglah air bah yang melanda ibukota New Orleans. Inilah yang mengakibatkan musibah kemanusiaan yang besar, yang menelan puluhan ribu jiwa. Padahal, empat tahun silam, majalah ilmiah-populer American Scientists sudah memperingatkan semua itu dalam artikel berjudul “New Orleans: A Disaster Waiting to Happen” yang terbit tahun 2001. Nah, kegagalan suatu negara maju untuk mengatasi musibah itulah yang mengungkap dampak berbentuk kebiadaban di Amerika itu – mulai dari perintah tembak di tempat, penjarahan, pengabaian dan penelantaran penduduk hitam dan miskin itu, dsb. Desivilisasi di Amerika ini tidak hanya menyengat isu politik dalam negeri Amerika, tapi juga menyengat perhatian dan pertanyaan dunia – bagaimana musibah dan aib itu bisa terjadi di negara terkuat, termaju dan terkaya di jagad ini? Sivilisasi Aceh Tsunami di Aceh dan Asia Tenggara, juga datang setelah musibah lain, yaitu gempa hebat yang mengundang orang mengeruk ikan-ikan yang terdampar di pantai, yang kemudian disusul gelombang tsunami yang menyapu manusia dan masyarakat pantai. Tiga minggu setelah musibah, saya menyaksikan dampaknya di pantai barat daya Aceh, antara Blang Pidie dan Meulaboh, juga di Banda Aceh dan Lamno. Di Aceh, tak ada perintah tembak setempat, bahkan tentara yang seringkali dimusuhi rakyat, malah turun tangan pertama kali untuk membantu para korban. Tentu, juga ada gejala penjarahan, oleh tentara, polisi atau pun warga. Juga warga memanfaatkan situasi dengan menaikkan harga obat-obatan dan pangan. Akan tetapi, desivilisasi semacam di New Orleans tidak terjadi. Yang terjadi, malahan semacam penyadaran, yaitu munculnya suatu kesadaran baru. Refleksi dan tanggapan yang populer dan meluas adalah menyalahkan diri sendiri. Tsunami, kata mereka, adalah karunia, atau hukuman Tuhan karena macam-macam ulah kita yang tidak pantas, katanya. Tentu saja, dunia tidak berputar karena pola sikap yang normatif seperti ini. Tetapi yang terjadi pasca-tsunami di Aceh bukanlah desivilisasi, melainkan justru sivilisasi – artinya, sejauh musibah itu membangkitkan refleksi, pemikiran serta kebangkitan baru dari masyarakat untuk menghadapi tantangan dan menempuh hidup baru. Sivilisasi Aceh yang amat berkontras dengan desivilisasi New Orleans ini tampak di kalangan muda. Seorang siswi SMP Meulaboh menjelaskan pada saya mengapa dia merasa perlu menghadapi kehidupan secara lebih serius, karena makna tsunami, katanya, adalah mengukur dosa dan berbagi sanksi Allah. Seorang penyiar radio, juga di Meulaboh, kehilangan seluruh sanak keluarganya, namun dia bangkit dengan tegar, lewat siaran-langsungnya, dengan cara bersilahturahmi dengan masyarakat dan mengajak para korban bangkit. Di Banda Aceh, sebuah komuniti membangun kebersamaan di Ullee Lhue tanpa menantikan inisiatif penguasa lokal, dsb, dsb. Tapi seperti dikatakan di atas, sivilisasi mau pun desivilisasi adalah proses, dan keduanya hadir, meski tidak selalu menggejala secara serentak. Sivilisasi di Amerika ternyata diselingi desivilisasi di New Orleans, sedangkan sivilisasi di Aceh pasca-tsunami menjadi selingan dari desivilisasi dari (pasca)-Orde Baru di Indonesia. Apalagi, bagi negeri seperti Aceh, batas antara dampak musibah alam dan dampak musibah buatan manusia, akhirnya, hanya tipis belaka. Sehingga yang tersisa adalah kerinduan akan damai yang memacu kebangkitan. Walhasil, luluh-lantaknya Aceh, yang bermusibah-ganda, baik musibah alam, gempa, banjir dan tsunami, mau pun bencana politik dan kemanusiaan semasa DOM dan konflik 30 tahun itu, adalah produk dari dinamika sivilisasi dan desivilisasi. Untuk sebagian, Aceh menjadi cermin dari desivilisasi Orde Baru. Perdamaian Aceh di Helsinki, menurut Kwik Kian Gie yang baru baru ini bertamu ke Radio Nederland, adalah semacam pampasan perang yang harus dibayar oleh Indonesia akibat kesalahan pusat dan kejahatan tentara di masa lalu. Tapi, Kwik lupa mencatat bedanya: selain bayar pampasan, para jendral Jepang dihukum oleh Tribunal Tokyo, sedangkan di Indonesia para jendral tetap menikmati impunitas - sekali pun pernah terjadi kejahatan perang di TimTim dan Aceh. Jadi, di mana pun juga, desivilisasi harus selalu dibayar atau diimbangi dengan sivilisasi – baik di Aceh maupun di New Orleans. © Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, all rights reserved